Natural gas production in Trinidad and Tobago has fallen to 2.5 billion cubic feet per day, down from a peak of 4 bcf/d in 2010. Atlantic LNG Train 1 has been permanently decommissioned. An outage from mid-February 2026 shut off approximately 25% of Atlantic LNG's remaining output.
The Energy Chamber's Q1 2026 survey found that 60% of energy services companies reported lower business value. Fifty-six percent reported below-typical volume. The sector that generates the bulk of Trinidad and Tobago's export earnings and government revenue is contracting.
Every major project that could reverse the decline points to the same year: 2027. bpTT's Ginger development. The Manatee project. EOG/bpTT's Coconut platform, currently under construction at the TOFCO yard. Juniper infill drilling. And the Dragon Gas final investment decision, which Shell targets for Q4 2027 with first production following.
This means 2026 is a bridge year. The country must cross it on declining production, borrowed reserves, and the hope that every one of these projects delivers on schedule.
The 2027 Convergence
The simultaneous targeting of 2027 across multiple operators is not coincidence. It reflects the lead times of upstream development in the offshore Trinidad and Tobago basin. Wells drilled in 2024-2025 reach production in 2027. Platforms fabricated now are installed and commissioned next year.
But convergence also means concentration of risk. If Ginger slips - and offshore projects routinely do - the revenue it was supposed to generate does not arrive on time. If Dragon's FID is delayed by the geopolitical complications of post-Maduro Venezuela, the entire LNG feedstock strategy is compromised. If Coconut encounters installation challenges, the timeline extends.
No single project failure would be catastrophic. But the budget and the forex projections assume that most or all of them deliver. The gap between "most" and "all" is where the fiscal risk lives.
The Paradox of High Prices
The Middle East conflict that escalated on February 28 disrupted approximately 20% of global LNG supply through the Strait of Hormuz. European gas benchmark TTF surged roughly 48%. Urea prices jumped from US$482 to US$720 per tonne. Ammonia moved from US$495 to US$600.
These are prices that should benefit Trinidad and Tobago enormously. Higher commodity prices on the same production volume means higher revenue. But the volume is not the same - it is declining. And the petrochemical sector, which should be capturing the price windfall, is operating below capacity. Nutrien is shut down. Atlantic LNG lost a quarter of its output.
Trinidad and Tobago has spare LNG liquefaction capacity but insufficient feedstock gas to fill it. It has a price environment that rewards production increases at exactly the moment production is falling. The country is sitting next to a fire sale with an empty wallet.
The Bridge Year Economy
The 2026 budget was built on assumptions about revenue that the Q1 energy sector data is already undermining. The US$1 billion sovereign bond issued in late 2025 provided a fiscal cushion, but that money is being consumed by debt servicing, public sector commitments, and the operational costs of maintaining the State of Emergency.
The IMF projects 0.7% GDP growth for 2026. The Central Bank's repo rate sits at 3.5%, unchanged since March 2020. The forex reserves, stripped of the bond injection, show a declining trend.
All of this is manageable if 2027 delivers. Ginger and Coconut start producing. Manatee comes online. Dragon reaches FID. Gas production recovers from 2.5 toward the 3.2 bcf/d target. Revenue rises. Reserves stabilise. The bridge holds.
If it does not - if the projects slip by even a year - then the bridge year becomes two bridge years, and the fiscal position deteriorates further into the territory the IMF is warning about.
What We Should Be Watching
The contract expiry dates across downstream operators at Point Lisas - Methanex, Proman, NGL, and the remaining producers - are not publicly compiled. These contracts determine how much gas stays in Trinidad and Tobago and at what price. As Nutrien's experience shows, contract disputes can shut down major facilities with cascading consequences.
The "bridge year" revenue gap - the difference between what the budget assumed and what Q1 energy sector performance suggests - has not been calculated publicly. This gap determines how much of the US$1 billion bond will be consumed by fiscal 2026 and how much remains as a buffer.
The question is not whether 2027 will be better. The projects are real and the operators are committed. The question is whether 2026 can be survived without lasting damage to the fiscal position, the forex reserves, and the downstream industrial base that turns gas into jobs and export earnings.
Everything is pinned on next year. The country is running on fumes in the meantime.