The Dragon Gas project has been discussed for over 40 years. The Loran-Manatee cross-border gas field, shared between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, contains an estimated 10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. It is a giant resource that could transform Trinidad and Tobago's energy outlook for decades.
It has never been developed. Kaieteur News captured the history in a single observation: "Dragon waited forty years not because gas was difficult, but because alignment was never held long enough."
In early January 2026, US military operations resulted in the extraction of Venezuelan President Maduro. The geopolitical alignment that Dragon requires - between Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, the United States, and the international oil companies - broke again.
Where Things Stand
Shell, which holds the development rights on the Trinidad and Tobago side, targets a final investment decision and first production in Q4 2027. Shell and BP have filed new OFAC licence requests with the US Treasury to continue operations related to Venezuelan gas resources. The US has issued two General Licences for Trinidad and Tobago energy activities in Venezuela. Secretary of State Rubio has expressed support.
Foreign Minister Sobers acknowledged in Parliament that there is "no certainty" on Dragon Gas following the change in Venezuelan leadership.
The complication is layered. Any royalty payments that would have gone to the Venezuelan government must now be directed to a US-controlled fund - a consequence of the regime change and the sanctions architecture surrounding it. Venezuela's new interim government may not honour licences and agreements negotiated under Maduro. And the operational requirements of a cross-border gas project - pipeline construction, regulatory coordination, revenue sharing - depend on stable governance on both sides of the maritime border.
Why Dragon Matters
Dragon Gas is not one project among many for Trinidad and Tobago. It is the project that could reverse the production decline that has defined the last decade. Gas output at 2.5 bcf/d, down from 4 bcf/d at peak, constrains the entire downstream economy - the LNG trains at Atlantic, the petrochemical plants at Point Lisas, and the government revenue that flows from all of it.
The 2026 budget projects gas production recovering to 3.2 bcf/d by 2027. That projection includes contributions from Dragon. If Dragon does not reach FID on schedule, the production target becomes harder to achieve, the fiscal projections weaken, and the bridge year extends.
The other 2027 projects - bpTT's Ginger, the Coconut platform, Manatee, Juniper infill - are progressing. But none of them individually replaces the volume that Dragon would deliver. Dragon is the difference between recovery and managed decline.
The 40-Year Pattern
The reason Dragon has never been developed is not technical. The engineering is understood. The resource is proven. The commercial case is strong, especially at current gas prices.
The barrier has always been political alignment. Trinidad and Tobago needs a government willing to negotiate cross-border terms. Venezuela needs a government stable enough to honour those terms. The US needs to either lift sanctions or issue licences that permit the project to proceed. And the oil companies need sufficient confidence in all three alignments to commit billions in development capital.
For brief periods, these conditions have coexisted. Each time, something has shifted - a change in government, a change in sanctions policy, a change in Venezuela's internal stability - and the alignment has collapsed.
The current moment is no different. Shell is ready. The US is supportive. Trinidad and Tobago is willing. But Venezuela's governance is in transition, the legal framework for royalty payments has been restructured by the US, and the licence holders on the Venezuelan side may not survive the political change.
The Endgame
Dragon Gas will eventually be developed. The resource is too large, the need too great, and the commercial incentives too strong for it to remain in the ground indefinitely. The question is not whether but when - and whether Trinidad and Tobago will be in a position to benefit when the alignment finally holds.
Every year of delay is a year of declining domestic production, a year of underutilised LNG infrastructure, and a year of lost revenue at a time when the country cannot afford to lose any. The 40-year wait has not been passive. It has been actively costly.
Shell's 2027 target is the latest date on a timeline that has been reset many times. Whether this one holds depends on forces beyond Trinidad and Tobago's control - which is the fundamental vulnerability of building an energy strategy around a cross-border resource in one of the world's most geopolitically complicated neighbourhoods.